

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SOCIAL PROGRESS

The Current Crisis in Human Rights

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CONTENTS: March, 1957

From This Vantage Point 3

Articles

Through Christ Alone, *by H. B. Sissel* 7

Who Wants to Live Where?—*A Survey* 12

Power and Desegregation, *by Morris Rosenberg* 13

Covenants of Open Occupancy 20

Controversy Over "Right to Work" Laws, *by Marshal L. Scott* 23

The Walls Come Tumbling Down, *by Margaret E. Kuhn* 29

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From This Vantage Point...

CRISIS IN HUMAN RIGHTS

Racial segregation is a problem of such size and urgency that it dwarfs all other social issues in American life today.

It is a large problem dimensionally because (1) it affects more than 10 per cent of our population—the members of the Negro and other minority groups who are on the receiving end of discrimination; (2) all who discriminate are likewise affected, in an adverse way, and they are a huge number of people; (3) practically all sections of the country are involved in the problem—not only the South where the issue is pervasive, but nearly every community, South and North, East and West, where Negroes and other minorities live, and many places where they do not live and where people in their pale isolation and pride believe they have "no problem"; and (4) racial discrimination for every person who has to face it is likely to be a day-after-day occurrence for as long as he lives, deeply affecting many aspects of his well-being.

As for the urgency of the problem, let us remember that racial discrimination has in it an element of cruelty. It is compounded of separate acts of humiliation. These, through determined repetition, become a pattern, a cage, in which freedom is stifled. But each act in the total pattern hurts. And anything that hurts cries for immediate attention and remedy.

The impassioned reaction to the Supreme Court decision on public school segregation has uncovered some of the ugly realities of racial discrimination in American life. These realities have been with us for a long time, but in their new prominence they became a national moral crisis.

The issue of racial discrimination is especially critical because of its wide repercussion in international relations.

We cannot exaggerate the extent and intensity of interest in American race relations on the part of people around the world—notably among the "colored" peoples of Asia, Africa, the Mideast, Southeast Asia. What they see is the disparity between our proud (and loud) democratic assertions and the denial of human rights at the heart of racial segregation.

Among those inclined to be friendly to America (and that means most of the people in the "areas of rapid social change") this is a matter of deep concern and worry. They ask, "How can that happen in America?" Among the unfriendly (and they are many), our "actions" are more convincing than our words.

The churches of America are deeply concerned about the moral crisis in race relations, but they need to see that they themselves are part of the problem.

"It is not easy to condemn . . . the doctrine of white supremacy in the state if it exists and is suffered to exist within the church." This was said by Father Trevor Huddleston about the situation confronting the churches of South Africa. It is pertinent to the American dilemma.

Much of the resistance to racial integration in the life and membership of local churches has been broken. At least, our church leaders support the idea that no barriers should be thrown in the way of integration. An effective barrier to real accomplishment, however, is complacency, accepting the *status quo*, doing nothing to achieve the goal of "inclusive fellowship." So a great deal still needs to be done on the level of local demonstration if the churches are to speak forcefully and convincingly to the issue of segregation in American life.

In our church-related institutions, too, there is room for a lot of demonstration. Presbyterian colleges accept Negro students, but how many of them have racially integrated faculties or boards of directors? We know of only one of our colleges (besides those designed to serve Negro students) that has a Negro person on its teaching staff, and none with a Negro director.

Our homes for the aged (including facilities for retired ministers) present an even more uniform picture of racial restriction—children's homes to a lesser degree.

In many communities in the North and West, where the "race question" is generally regarded as having been solved, there are still lingering forms of racial discrimination.

Integration in many communities may be a fact in regard to schools, transportation, publicly owned facilities and services, but conspicuously absent in (1) employment opportunities (more than the menial jobs) for Negroes, (2) accommodations in hotels and motels, (3) service in restaurants, (4) nondiscriminatory care in hospitals (which means not being shunted to clinics or admitted only to wards), (5) fair and equal treatment

in stores (which includes the right to try on hats and dresses just like anybody else). An article by Margaret Kuhn, on p. 29, suggests practical ways for churches to try to change this kind of situation.

Churches and churchmen, in union with other forces of good will in the community, have a continuing obligation, by all that our faith means in this area of expression, to encourage laws against discrimination and against unfair labor practices. Where the laws are adequate in guaranteeing civil rights for all, the effort should continue in the direction of their acceptance and implementation.

In many places, churches and churchmen can urge the creation and support the work of such bodies as the mayor's commission on human rights.

Our churches would seem to be in a unique position to bring pressure to bear upon the most persistent "pattern of racial discrimination"—residential segregation.

In recent hearings in Washington on civil rights proposals, an Ohio Congressman declared that Northern prejudice "can be seen to take effect at the city limits," adding that few suburban areas are open to all Americans. In one of our Northern cities known for its "brotherly love," of 45,000 new housing units erected in a period of several years, fewer than 50 were available to Negro families. In that city, it should be said, Negroes constitute about 20 per cent of the population and the pressure from within the Negro community for new (meaning more adequate) housing is very great.

The 1956 General Assembly pronouncement calling upon our churches to band Christians together in "covenants of open occupancy" goes to the very heart of America's malady of racial discrimination.

We have learned of two churches in which this pronouncement has been taken seriously. Undoubtedly there are others. We know that this is a "hard" pronouncement to put into effect. Yet we dare to hope that discussions of race relations in our churches will more and more take account of the problem of adequate housing for Negro families and will encourage Christians to support "open occupancy" in principle and in practice.

The article "Covenants of Open Occupancy," p. 20, makes practical suggestions to other churches that may wish to put the pronouncement into practice.

There exist, in both white and Negro communities, many inaccurate stereotypes as to "what Negroes want" (and what white people want Negroes to want). The results of a survey on housing preferences recently concluded by the *Catholic Digest* are printed on p. 12 of this issue, and should provide accurate information to help answer the question, "Don't most Negroes want to live with Negroes (or whites)?"

As our society moves, in some places slowly, in others more rapidly, toward desegregation, social scientists who have been studying the factors of movement and resistance have done some careful analysis of the elements involved. One of them concludes that power—in many forms and exerted

in many ways—will be an inevitable ingredient of any successful desegregation efforts. Morris Rosenberg's "Power and Desegregation," p. 13, is a closely reasoned and tightly written analysis of the various kinds of power available, the feasibility of their use, and the ethical implications of some of them.

What with many different kinds of people and organizations working for civil rights—some Christian, many secular—Christians sometimes find themselves making common cause with others who are going in the same direction, humanly speaking. What differentiates the Christian from all these other groups working for similar goals in a pluralistic society? H. B. Sissel attempts a tentative answer to this question in "Through Christ Alone," on p. 7.

The term "human rights" encompasses many issues besides the race issue. One of these is the question of "right to work" laws now existing in seventeen states and contemplated in others. Marshal L. Scott, Director of the Presbyterian Institute of Industrial Relations and perhaps the best-informed person in the church on labor-management relations, gives, on p. 23, an objective appraisal of the significance of these laws with the arguments pro and con.

The SEA Staff

—What is the uniquely Christian contribution to "the race problem"?

Through Christ Alone

By H. B. Sissel, Associate Secretary, Department of Social Education and Action

Christians in the Reformed or Calvinistic tradition have had the same question, in varied form, leveled at them for four centuries: If everything depends ultimately on God, why should we try to do anything? In the quest for racial justice and brotherhood the answer is simply that God has called (elected) us to be his own in Christ, and as God's people we are to be used by him to accomplish his will. This is for us obedience. It is for him the way he works. We are to work and pray because God commands us—we are under his constraint, we cannot help ourselves, if we understand our calling. If some non-Christians seek justice for other reasons, and if some Christians do not seek justice at all, nevertheless, if we *know* God's will in race relations, we cannot but try to obey him and be used as instruments of his will. For us to do less is to be less than human, let alone less than Christian.

THIS article seeks, with considerable trepidation, to answer the question: What uniquely and distinctively can the Christian and the church (particularly in the Reformed tradition) bring to a "racial" situation? Or, to put it another way: Is there such a thing as a "Christian way" in race relations as distinguished from all other enlightened, humanitarian ways?

The question is raised because of a common tendency among Christians today to use the word "Christian" as a descriptive adjective to label particular kinds of conduct, attitude, or policy with which they strongly agree. One example of this uncritical use of the word "Christian" as an adjective can be seen in the work of a devout Christian who referred to the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights—the product of many minds, Christian and non-Christian—as a Christian document. The Bill of Rights of our Federal Constitution has also been the beneficiary of the "Christian" label.

Not a Semantic Problem . . .

It would be fruitless to ask the next logical question: What do you mean by "Christian"? and make the problem purely one of semantics. Our problem is, really, what can the Christian and the church bring to the tragic conflict in race relations that no other person and no other group can bring? And we must try to be ruthlessly honest in seeking the

answer, lest we deceive ourselves and bring upon the church the smiling contempt of the secular world it deserves when it is careless in its thinking.

Our problem is complicated in the extreme by the fact that our society is one in which Christians and the church have played major roles from its very beginning—in politics, in economics, in social relations. The abolitionist movement, for example, got much of its initial impetus from the passionate conviction of certain Christians that slavery was contrary to the will of God, as well as a violation of human personality and worth. They were joined by humanitarians in whose motivation obedience to God as the ultimate obligation of man was almost totally absent, or at least reduced to a secondary or tertiary place in their scale of values.

The point is that the Christian faith has seeded into our culture, and hence into the lives of individuals and groups who would either reject or ignore Christianity, a whole configuration of values, standards, and goals that have become an integral part of "the American way of life." To make the picture still more complicated, these values, standards, and goals have been modified by the culture (certainly secularized) and fed back into the church, which has often uncritically accepted them in their modified and sometimes corrupted form as its own.

. . . But a Theological One

Our problem here is to understand and think clearly about our heritage as Christians, not so that we may feel superior to others, but so that we may know who we are, upon Whom we depend and to Whom we look. If we look about us and see Christians not acting as we think Christians should act, this does not reflect upon our heritage but (if we are correct) upon their rejection of our heritage. It may also reflect their rejection of their *humanity*. If, on the other hand, we look about us and see non-Christians acting as we think Christians should act, this should not trouble us, but cause us to rejoice, because much of what Christians *should* do, they should and can do simply because they are human beings.

For example, certain "natural" virtues are common to all rational, sensitive, and imaginative human beings —such things as a love of justice, a sense of pity, a desire for men to live together as brothers, a hope for peace, and so forth. If we find these and other qualities missing from large numbers of men, it is not simply because they have rejected Christ (we also find these qualities missing in Christians who have not rejected him), but because they have become, in part at least, irrational, insensitive, or unimaginative, in short, because they have rejected their humanity, or have not yet discovered it.

What distinguishes the Christian from such persons (and "such persons" includes everyone in some degree, since all, including Christians, are sinners) is that he has met and knows Jesus Christ. And in Jesus Christ he finds the one who quite clearly demonstrates humanity as God intended it to be.

The Christian, knowing Jesus Christ, has a "standard" of humanity that makes his own sin obvious to him, and casts him inevitably on the

mercy of God, unless he turns his back on his Christ. In that case, he becomes a "natural man" with all the faults and virtues, and ambiguous mixtures of the two, that can be found in anybody else. Only now, without Christ (and this is the crucial thing) he no longer *knows* it. Whereas before he was lost like all men and, unlike others, *knew* it (and cast himself on God's mercy), now he is lost and *doesn't* know it.

What then does the Christian, who knows Christ and consequently himself, bring that no one else can bring?

Who Is a Good Neighbor?

To begin with, we need to reject any good-Samaritan-like concern as a distinctively Christian contribution to human relations in general or race relations in particular.

An automobile crashed through a roadside barrier at night, overturned in a ditch, and pinned its driver in agony under the wreckage. Traffic sped past on both sides, either unseeing or unconcerned. Finally, another driver stopped, saw the wreckage, investigated, and found the bloody, then unconscious victim. He pulled him from under the car, carried him to his own waiting automobile, and sped him to the emergency ward of a hospital in the next town. There he waited, hoped, and sweated for two hours while a surgeon worked over the broken body. When the surgeon had finished, he came out to the waiting rescuer and, on discovering that he was no relative, but a stranger, said, "That was truly a Christian thing you did."

Whereupon the stranger replied: "I'm not a Christian. I'm a Jew. I'd call it a Jewish thing I did."

Which raises the interesting question: Suppose he had been an atheist. Would his act of mercy have been an atheistic act?

Similarly, to return to the racial situation, this writer has frequently sat in various strategy conferences to determine the best way to proceed toward equal educational, employment, or housing opportunities for all, regardless of color. Present usually were Jews, Friends, Unitarians, an agnostic or two, and on several occasions an atheistic humanist. The Christians there had no noticeable monopoly (or even superiority) in either wisdom or compassionate concern.

Further, the ethical sensitivity of the participants seemed marked by no visible religious label, and disagreements as to the moral appropriateness of certain procedures—the use of subterfuge, for example—were as common between persons belonging to the same religious community as between persons belonging to different religious communities.

Anyone who has taken and given counsel in such a group, whether it be of social workers, intergroup relations specialists, community relations experts, civil liberties lawyers, or social scientists, can probably cite similar experiences of finding no empirical evidence of a distinctive contribution from any particular religious (or irreligious) group. Billy Graham to the contrary, one can and does derive his sensitivity to racial injustice, his desire to do something about it, his effectiveness in doing something about it, even his patience (or impatience) in being unable to do very much about it, from a variety of sources and experiences, including his religion, which may be Christian, non-Christian, or even anti-Christian.

theologically speaking. God works when, where, as, and with whom he pleases.

Objections

Some Christians may find such an assertion offensive to them. And it may well be that the writer has overlooked some quality that is peculiarly (and empirically) Christian. If so, he invites careful thought as to what that quality may be. (Let no one say "love," however, until he has exposed himself to the sensitivity and empathy of a particular kind of humanist —often a woman—who has the rare capacity to feel in his own flesh and spirit the wounds and aspirations of others. Occasionally the Christian will love with the same love with which Christ loves him. But these moments are rare. More characteristically, the love of Christ will brand the best love the Christian—and the humanist—can muster as but a poor counterfeit.)

Other Christians may say that such an interpretation of the word "Christian" is too narrow, that such people as are referred to above are really "Christians" at heart—they just don't call themselves by that name. Such an interpretation of Christianity, however, hardly squares with the New Testament one. At least, it does not follow the major evangelical traditions, which rightly or wrongly see the Christian faith not primarily as an adherence to certain ethical, intellectual, and emotional standards, but as a conscious response of the person to Jesus Christ and his good news of God's forgiveness. That many persons who have responded to Jesus Christ and his gospel still do not manifest in their lives "enlightened" race attitudes may well be due to the fact that their faith has never been challenged by either experience or preaching (both are usually necessary) in that area.

Through Christ Alone

What, then, is available to the Christian and the church through Christ alone with regard to race relations, even though it may not manifest itself to an objective observer? (Here the trepidation really begins.)

First, the faith-knowledge that all creation, all life, and, in the context of this discussion, all "race relations" are under the Lordship of Christ, who rules and overrules the plans and desires of rebellious, sinful men. This faith leaves the Christian ultimately (though not immediately) confident of the final outcome of the battle for justice and love in the earth, since that outcome depends, not upon him and other weak and sinful creatures like him, but upon the sovereign power of God Almighty.

It also relieves him of the compulsion to ascribe to Christians and the church before the world any superior knowledge, wisdom, compassion, power, or understanding as over against that of atheists, humanists, and others who may be arrayed either with him or against him in the struggle. Since "all things are from God," the Christian need not try to compare his own effectiveness favorably with that of another not of his faith, or his righteousness defensively with that of someone else. It should not trouble him that a Jew, for example, feels more deeply or plans more wisely or acts more effectually than he. On the contrary, he is grateful to God for all this. To Jesus

Christ, who rules, belongs the glory, and the Christian ought to know it.

Self-understanding

Secondly, a knowledge of his own sinfulness, the mixed motives that lead him to concern and action, as well as those of others. Finding it unnecessary to compare himself favorably with others (compared to Jesus Christ, his righteousness and everyone else's is as filthy rags), he can know and honestly acknowledge the sin that he contributes to any strategy, procedure, or solution to a race problem, and therefore need not be shocked or surprised that every solution creates new problems.

He may also, because of his knowledge of his own sin, be led into humility, and become less judgmental of the prejudices of others. But we need to be honest here and recognize the professional intergroup relations expert's ability to avoid moralistic judgments on prejudice—for other reasons. He knows they lessen his effectiveness.

The Christian has experienced in himself both the judgment of God and the mercy of God, and under the Holy Spirit in the church can discern in the facts, events, and movements that are seen by anyone else what no one else can see without the spectacles of faith—the working out of the same judgment and mercy of God. This should (though it may not) give him a unique appreciation for, and identification with, the tragedy and ambiguity of all human existence, so that he neither overestimates the potential for good in man, nor underestimates the power of evil. He has a certain pessimism, not found in professionals, about the ability of men to solve their problems; but it is always qualified by an ultimate hope that "is not seen."

The professional is tempted to "expect the best and suspect the worst" of man, and both the strategy he adopts and the persistence he exercises depend upon the likelihood of "success." The Christian knows the worst, because he knows that it was men—good men like himself—who crucified Jesus Christ. Knowing this, he can hope only in God, who redeems just such men. And hoping in God alone, he hopes in the only power that ultimately can overthrow evil. What else is worth hoping in?

An Invisible Difference

Since none of these uniquely Christian "qualities" (and there may be others) is empirically discernible, it is impossible to speak or write of them with the same clarity and precision as of those qualities available to any sensitive, intelligent, and experienced human being. It may well be that there is no "Christian way" in race relations—only a Christian way of looking at the ways.

The Christian alone knows the difference, and then often only as he lies in his bed, close to despair at the immediate prospects of continued injustice. The despair also is of God. Only the Christian knows it and confesses it before God in the church, as he also confesses his hope.

Who Wants to Live Where?

WHERE do Negroes want to live? They want to live where they can afford to live, according to the findings of the *Catholic Digest* survey of the race problem.

"When someone says, 'Negroes want to move into white neighborhoods,' someone else always answers, 'No, Negroes are happier living near other Negroes.' Most of us have heard both opinions. Which is true?

Neither. That's what a public-opinion research agency, Ben Gaffin & Associates, discovered. An overwhelming majority of Negroes say that it doesn't matter!

"Do you think that most Negroes want to live in white neighborhoods or in Negro neighborhoods or that it doesn't matter to them?"

Negroes Want to Live—	Whites North	Whites South	Negroes
Among whites	20%	12%	6%
Among Negroes	44	74	19
Doesn't matter	28	10	68

The *Catholic Digest* survey showed that there are many misunderstandings about the race question. This is one example. Almost half the Northern whites, and three out of four Southern whites, think that Negroes like living in Negro neighborhoods. Yet only one out of five Negroes actually does like it. Negro opinion contradicts both the idea that Negroes prefer segregation and the opposite idea that they are trying to take over white neighborhoods.

Seven out of ten Negroes say that it doesn't matter where they live. What they want is simply what everybody else wants—a chance to live where they please.

Although many Negroes still have substandard incomes, Negro income as a whole has soared 350 per cent in the twenty years since 1936. Many Negroes can now afford luxuries, but their increased buying power has had little effect on their ability to buy homes of their own choosing. When a white couple goes house-hunting, their choice is restricted only by taste and pocketbook. A Negro couple must scan the want ads with wary eyes. That neighborhood—that one and that one—they're out, right from the start. Only whites can live there.

There is a great contrast between Northern and Southern white opinion on this question. But a majority of both groups definitely favor separate projects. Negroes, just as definitely, desire such housing projects to be occupied by both races.

Practically speaking, if a Negro were offered the choice between a slum and a new but segregated housing project, he would choose the project. But he goes to the project, as he went to the slum, because there is no other place for him to go. What he really wants is freedom of choice. A project "for Negroes only" is just one more restriction on his freedom.

Information used here is from the seventh article of a series in the *Catholic Digest* (December, 1956), and is used by permission.

Power and Desegregation

By Morris Rosenberg, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Cornell University

Excerpts from "Social Problems," April, 1956. Used by permission

VARIOUS signs, such as the conflict between state and national authorities and the eruption of incidents of violence point to the conclusion that desegregation is essentially a problem of power. It seems appropriate to attempt to classify and describe the various forms of power and to consider how these forms may be applied to the problem of desegregation.

Power in Social Relations

Basically, power is a form of social interaction. "A person may be said to have power to the extent that he influences the behavior of others in accordance with his own intentions" (Goldhamer and Shils). People in every society are constantly getting others to do what they want them to do.

It is customary to think of power as positive—getting people to do what you want them to do. But it would represent an oversight to neglect two other types of power—*filter power* and *veto power*. The most obvious example of filter power is that exercised by the secretary to an important executive. The secretary may not be able to influence others in a positive way, but she can influence the course of events by allowing certain people to see the executive at certain times and preventing others from doing so.

In speaking of the veto power, we mean that an individual may not be able to get people to do what he wants, but he may be able to prevent them from doing what they want. An obvious example is the Senatorial filibuster, when a handful of men can prevent the majority of Senators from realizing the majority will.

Bases of Compliance and Obedience

One approach to the problem of distinguishing the various forms of power is to ask the question, "Why does one person do what another wants him to do?" The classification of "reasons" for such behavior should encompass all dimensions of power. From the point of view of the power-subject, he may yield either voluntarily or involuntarily.

The most obvious reason for one person to carry out the will of another is coercion. Whether violence, deprivations, or other forms of sanctions are employed by the power-wielder, the common characteristic is that the power-subject does not want to behave in accord with the other's intentions, but is compelled to do so.

On the other hand, there are a number of reasons why a person will raise no objection to having other people tell him what to do. Some of these can be subsumed under the heading of authority—the acknowledgment of another's right to direct our actions. There are several different bases upon which this right may be founded.

Authoritative Forms of Power

Competence-charismatic power. The first form of authoritative power is based on the power-subject's respect or admiration for the power-wielder. This may be called competence-charismatic power. Charismatic authority, as Max Weber has shown, is characterized by loyalty and devotion to a leader, based on an emotional attachment to an individual invested with a magnetic personality who is assumed to be fulfilling a "mission." Competence authority is also founded upon respect for the power-wielder, but it has a more intellectual and less emotional base than charismatic authority. One person follows another's direction out of respect for the latter's superior ability, knowledge, experience, skill, or competence.

Functional power. A second form of authority lies in the recognition of the functional necessity for following the directions of a person in a particular position. A football team will accept and carry through the directives of the quarterback because they realize that centralization of authority is necessary for co-ordinated action. Here the authority is vested in the position, not the person. The ten other football players do not follow the quarterback's direction because of an emotional attachment to him or a conviction of his superior ability; they would behave in a similar fashion irrespective of who the quarterback happened to be.

Traditional power. The third form of authority—traditional legitimation—is rooted in the very process of socialization. As people are socialized in a culture, they become aware that certain institutional groups or individuals have power and characteristically control their behavior. By feeling that whatever is, is right (i.e., legitimate), they come to accept the power of persons in certain statuses and offices as an unquestionable fact, as little subject to attack as the laws of nature. It never occurs to many workers, for example, to question the employer's authority to decide what product is to be turned out in his factory (although they may challenge his authority at other points).

The bases for such legitimation vary. In some cases, the power-wielder may anchor his claim for legitimate power in the sacred lore of the society. For example the Supreme Court appeals to the "higher tribunal" of the Constitution as the basis of justification for its decisions. A great deal of power exercise is of this traditional type—one person simply has the right to tell another what to do.

Contractual power. The final form of authority might be called, using the term very broadly, contractual power. In this case, the power-wielder offers something to the power-subject in order to obtain behavioral compliance with his intentions. Probably

the most common operation of this principle appears in those cases in which one person purchases the behavior of another.

The special characteristic of this power is that it is reciprocal; it places the power-wielder under obligation to the power-subject, so that each directs the other's behavior.

Nonauthoritative Forms of Power

There are certain types of power characterized by the fact that one person willingly behaves in accord with the intention of another but does not acknowledge this other person's right to tell him what to do.

Persuasion. One of the most common forms of nonauthoritative power is persuasion. In an age of mass communications, this source of power acquires particular importance. In principle, the characteristics of the power-wielder—his magnetism, ability, status—are irrelevant; it is the argument that counts. The art of mass persuasion is one of the most widely used forms of power in contemporary society.

Manipulation. Another form of willing power occurs when the power-subject carries out the intention of the power-wielder without knowing that he is doing so. This form of power exercise has been called manipulation. Subtle propaganda, in which the intent of the propagandist is obscure, would exemplify this form of power.

The devices of manipulation are legion—whether we tell a particularly perverse child to do one thing because we really want him to do its opposite; whether we go out with one person in order to make a second envious. Whatever form of manipulation is employed, the common factor is that other people have behaved in accord with our intentions without being aware of the fact.

Less Power?

There is a common belief that recent Western history has seen a decline in the use of power in society. We are inclined to question this view. Men are probably as interested in influencing the behavior of others as they ever were. There has been a shift in the forms of power exercised: a decreased emphasis upon coercive and authoritative power and an increased stress upon nonauthoritative forms of power. In addition, the loci of power today are more obscure. This shift has resulted in a greater general sense of "freedom," but there is no assurance that there has been an actual decrease in the amount of power exercised.

The Measurement of Power

In order to bring about desegregation it will probably be necessary to affect those with the greatest power. What factors must be considered in measuring an individual's power?

Although it is difficult to assign specific weights to any factors, we may say that the number of people an individual influences in accord with his intentions, the scope of their lives he controls, the certitude of this control, and the degree of behavioral modification effected must all be considered in such measurement.

Number of people. All other things equal, the person who can influence the behavior of many people in accord with his own intentions has

greater power than the one who can influence but few.

Power, however, may be mediate or immediate. This point has been stressed by the sociometrists, who have distinguished between "powerful" and "popular" individuals. An individual may influence but few people directly, but if these people themselves have a great deal of power, he may ultimately influence vast numbers of people in accord with his own intentions. Common parlance refers to such an individual as "the power behind the throne."

Scope of lives. In certain areas, the life scope that the power-wielder may influence is clearly defined and delimited. An employer may control the working behavior of his employees during working hours, but any efforts he might make to control their political, religious, family, and leisure ideas and behavior would probably be resisted. On the other hand, a parent may control the political, economic, and religious behavior of a child, the clothes he wears, the movies he sees, and so on. There is virtually no area of the child's life over which the parent may not exercise some power. By contrast, a movie star may induce millions of young women to purchase a certain brand of cosmetic, but her power will not extend beyond this limited scope of their lives.

Certitude of control. Other things equal, we may say that a person who can be sure that others will do what he wants has more power than one who can only hope that they will follow his will. This is one reason why the individual who can invoke immediate, violent, and direct sanctions is usually considered a person of greater power than one who must plead with others to get them to do what he wants.

Modification of behavior. We have said, in essence, that power is exercised when A gets B to do what A wants him to do. But if B was doing it anyway, then no power has been exercised. The amount of power that one person exercises over another, therefore, may be conceived of as the difference between how the power-subject actually behaves and how he would have behaved had the power-wielder not sought to influence him. This amount of power corresponds to the amount of resistance that must be overcome.

Selecting Forms of Power

The question arises: Which is the best form of power to use? Whether one form of power is "best" can only be determined if we specify the criteria upon which the evaluation is to be made. With regard to the desegregation issue, three criteria seem especially important: feasibility, effectiveness, and ethicality.

Many forms of power which rate well on one criterion will rate poorly on another. For example, if it be suggested that in order to win elections, a legislator should have a personal talk with each of his constituents, explaining the basis of his decisions (persuasive power), this might be an effective solution, and it would certainly be an ethical one, but the pressure of business makes it clearly unfeasible for him to converse personally with thousands of people. On the other hand, if it is suggested that he send out a letter to his constituents

presenting the arguments in favor of his decisions, this is both a feasible and an ethical solution, but probably not an effective one. Finally, if the idea is offered to bribe the constituents handsomely to vote for the legislator, this might be both a feasible and effective power solution, but most people would balk at the ethics involved.

Probably any solution to the desegregation problem is an imperfect one in terms of at least one of the relevant criteria. The key conflict is whether you use means you don't like in order to achieve ends you do like. This question is complicated by an additional consideration, namely, whether it may not be unethical to allow an unjust state of affairs (such as discrimination) to exist without using all the means available (even undesirable ones) to rectify it.

Implications for Desegregation

Although Americans tend to view power with suspicion, there is little doubt that if the advocates of desegregation succeed in getting reluctant state and local authorities to implement the Supreme Court policy, they will be exercising power. The point is that there is a wide range of alternative power devices which may be used, but not all of them are equally satisfactory.

It seems probable that the form of power most congenial to the proponents of desegregation is the nonauthoritative device of *persuasion.* The desegregationists would like to convince their opponents that the racist arguments are scientifically baseless, that segregation violates basic American values, that the group which discriminates is harmed as well as the group discriminated against, and so on.

There are at least two reasons why persuasion is particularly likely to be viewed with favor. The first is that the goal of power (i.e., desegregation) is not of an urgent sort which necessarily requires coercive or authoritative forms of power (although these may be employed). The second point is that within the democratic value framework, rational persuasion is considered the most ethical power device.

The main drawback to the use of persuasion lies in its relative ineffectiveness in the present situation. Racial prejudice is a deeply rooted, effect-laden attitude, frequently providing important psychological, social, and economic gratifications to its possessor. It seems unlikely that persuasion will be effective in changing most Southerners' attitudes toward segregation.

Now let us consider the opposite form of power: *coercion.* Given the monopoly over the legitimate means of violence possessed by the state, there is little doubt that coercion is both an effective and feasible solution to the problem of desegregation. There are at least two problems involved in its use, however. The [first is that the] use of involuntary power would violate the ethical precepts of many people. The repugnance of coercion is so general that most people will consider it only as a last resort, if at all. The second problem is that, in the exercise of coercive power, one must consider the unintentional consequences of such action. If physical coercion leads to physical resistance, race riots, lynchings, and the solidification and in-

tensification of racial prejudice, then though desegregation may become a fact, many will feel that it has not been worth the consequences.

Competence-charismatic power is another device which may be considered in seeking to bring about desegregation. For example, if a man of Huey Long's stature had taken a stand in favor of desegregation, many of his loyal followers might have accepted his position, not because of what he said but because he said it.

Under the present circumstances, this would probably be considered an ethical power device, and it might be somewhat effective, but it does not appear to be too feasible. In the first place, it is difficult to find leaders whose followings are so loyal and so blindly devoted to them that their mere words can overcome the strongly rooted opposition to desegregation. Secondly, those leaders in the South who most strongly partake of charismatic qualities are precisely the ones who are the most diehard racists, and are therefore least likely to advance the cause of desegregation. Hence, the attempt to exercise charismatic-competence power does not appear to be very feasible and, in any case, it is doubtful whether it would be effective.

The application of *contractual power* to desegregation would be exemplified by an offer by the national Government to grant a community tax relief or promise to build a new school and bear other educational expenses on the condition that the community carried through a desegregation program. The recent suggestion that the Federal Government withhold financial aid to segregated schools exemplifies this principle perfectly. This is a feasible solution, and it may be more effective than we might at first assume.

The ethical issue, however, is cloudy. There are those who would reject this solution as a gross form of "bribery"; others would consider it a straightforward, businesslike proposition. This ethical problem is not susceptible of scientific analysis.

If we were to plant a false rumor that all school administrators who fail to implement the desegregation policy within thirty days will lose their jobs, and if the administrators as a consequence behave in accord with our intentions, we would have an example of *manipulative power.* Although this is a feasible solution, most people would reject the ethics involved. As far as effectiveness is concerned, this would depend on the ingenuity of the manipulator. In the present case, ethics aside, this does not appear to be a fruitful solution.

Power with a Future

The most promising form of authoritative power would appear to be the *traditional* form. This is the essence of any power exercised by the Supreme Court. The Court is constituted as a sacred body of interpreters of the written cultural tradition embodied in the Constitution. Most Americans thus unquestioningly accept the Court's right to tell them to render final decision with regard to questions falling within the Constitutional orbit. The present question is whether state and local officials accept the Court's right to tell them to abolish segregation. It is interesting to note that some Southern

enators who originally were unlterably opposed to desegregation evertheless yielded when the Court ad spoken.

One power solution may thus be to eek to increase the respect for, and we of, the sacred tribunal—the upreme Court. In other words, this olution would involve inducing local fficials to abolish segregation, not ecause of what the Court said (its ational arguments), but because the Court said it (its legitimate right to ell these officials what to do). Traditional legitimation appears to be an thical, feasible, and effective solution to the problem of desegregation.

Several Approaches

There is, of course, no reason why nly a single form of power need be xercised in bringing about desegregation. Several may be used in conunction. Considering only the riterion of effectiveness, however, it till would not be wise to use all possible power devices.

For example, if the power-wielder ses persuasion and traditional legitmation together, the result may be o reduce the effectiveness of the atter form. Once you start to explain to, plead with, cajole, or try o persuade a person to behave in ccord with your intentions, he may o longer accept your right to tell im what to do. Persuasion in this ase may defeat the exercise of leitimate power.

Similarly, if coercion is exercised nd is followed by persuasion, the ower-subject may be so incensed at he coercion that he becomes completely immune to the persuasive rguments. It is therefore necessary o consider the particular combination of power forms, as well as the unintentional consequences of power exercise, in examining the operation of power in the desegregation process.

Hopeful Outlook

There is one rather hopeful spot in what is altogether a difficult problem. If we apply the rough formula for the measurement of power mentioned earlier, it appears that the most powerful people tend to be those men strategically located in the industrial and commercial structure. These men tend to be far above the average in terms of their educational attainments. This suggests the following:

In the first place contractual power, such as an economic subsidy to desegregated schools or the threat to withhold a subsidy to segregated schools, is likely to be more effective with them than with other people. They bear much of the tax burden and would welcome relief.

In the second place, they are, by virtue of their superior education, more open to rational arguments (persuasive power) in favor of desegregation.

Thirdly, they are probably more likely than others to be aware of the formal cultural tradition, and therefore would have a greater tendency to value certain traditional power agencies, such as the Supreme Court.

It is not possible at this point to tell what the final outcome of the desegregation issue will be. It seems plain, however, that it will be impossible to understand subsequent developments thoroughly without viewing the desegregation issue within a power framework.

Covenants of Open Occupancy

Why are Presbyterians concerned?

From 1935 to 1950, a total of nine million new homes were constructed in our nation. *Of these, less than 1 per cent were available to nonwhite citizens.* Yet during this same period there was—and there continues to be—a phenomenal growth of the Negro middle class. In 1950, 17.8 per cent of Negroes were earning from $3,000 to $5,000 per year as compared with only 3.7 per cent in 1939. An additional 5.4 per cent earned more than $5,000 in 1950 as over against only 0.1 per cent in that bracket in 1939! Yet only a small fraction were able to secure new and better housing because of racial discrimination.

A study of housing in the Philadelphia metropolitan area (the city and seven surrounding counties) conducted by the Philadelphia Housing Association reveals that more than 140,000 units were built in that area from 1946 to 1953. How many were available to Negroes? Only 1,044 units or 1 per cent, yet Negroes comprise 13 per cent of the population of metropolitan Philadelphia and are rapidly moving into middle-class status in that community.

In Philadelphia itself, out of 45,000 privately developed new homes exactly 45 were available to Negro buyers between 1946 and 1953. Yet over 20,000 Negroes bought homes during this period.

The situation of the Negro in almost every other city in the U.S. was comparable to what it was in Philadelphia. In 1956 it had only slightly improved. The ugly fact is that discrimination in housing is one of the most pernicious and undemocratic practices in American life today.

The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church has said that residential segregation is not only undemocratic—it is against the will of God. *This is why Presbyterians are concerned.* We believe in and are committed to work for a nonsegregated society and a nonsegregated church. We believe that neither the church nor society will become racially inclusive to any significant extent until the American people and the realtors and brokers who represent them remove the bars of discrimination against persons of color who seek to improve their condition by moving into better and nonsegregated communities. We believe that Presbyterians should lead the way. We have, in the pronouncements of the 168th General Assembly, called upon the session of each local church to "bring Christians together in *covenants of open occupancy* which will stem the tendency toward 'panic selling,' and stabilize their neighborhoods on a nonsegregated basis" (from the Social Pronouncements of the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., May 30, 1956).

The Covenant

Believing in the church as the body of Christ in which worship in the sanctuary and witness before the world are enriched by the diversity of many brethren who, being of many races and backgrounds, find a deeper oneness in Christ;

Believing in the open door of church membership and the open hand of Christian fellowship across every barrier, that our church may demonstrate to a divided world the democracy and neighborliness we desire for our immediate community;

Believing that residential segregation is contrary to God's will and the American heritage of freedom and that every person, regardless of race, who intends to be a good and law-abiding neighbor, has a right to make his home in our midst with a claim upon our friendship and Christian concern; and

Acknowledging the call of the 168th General Assembly to all Presbyterians to form "covenants of open occupancy" which will promote inclusive residential patterns, mitigate "panic selling," and stabilize our neighborhoods on a nonsegregated basis,

We, the undersigned, members of _____ Presbyterian Church of _____, do hereby unite in this Covenant to:

1. Support one another, and all others who refuse to conform to racial discrimination in housing, with friendship, mutual aid, and corporate action to prevent either social ostracism or economic reprisal because of our practice of nondiscrimination.

2. Make known to our neighbors, if there is a tendency toward panic selling, that we will not sell our houses to escape racial integration but will urge others to stay and help maintain the standards of our community and all its institutions and agencies.

3. Make known to our neighbors whose houses are for sale that we would welcome into the neighborhood any new residents of good character regardless of their race, creed, or national origin.

4. Discuss thoughtfully and sensitively with our neighbors, when circumstances are appropriate, the meaning of open-occupancy housing and this Covenant, giving assurance that we, its signers, are deeply concerned about the permanent welfare of this community, and that if we move for other reasons, we will sell our homes only to qualified purchasers of good character, without regard to their race, creed, or national origin.

5. Seek to enlist our neighbors, whether or not they are members of the Presbyterian Church, to commit themselves to these same principles of action.

How to Organize COOP in Your Church

The General Assembly has asked sessions of local churches to initiate "covenants of open occupancy" among Presbyterian church members. The Department of Social Education and Action recommends the following procedure to ministers and sessions:

1. Appoint a member of the session or the SEA leaders of the church to study the geographic location of the members so that near neighbors, especially people in the same block or housing unit, could covenant together. This would mean that in one church there might be several covenants, or covenanting groups of three, four, or several families representing several different neighborhoods or blocks.

2. Invite all interested persons to a meeting when COOP could be explained and the Covenant discussed.

3. Encourage families of the church to assent to and sign the Covenant, the session giving an example of its own commitment by being the first to join in this act.

4. Designate a certain time during the year (preferably at a Sunday morning service) when families desiring to covenant may come forward in neighborhood groups and sign the Covenants in the spirit of prayer and service to God. A suggested brief Order of Service for such a special Sunday may be secured from the Department of Social Education and Action, 830 Witherspoon Building, Philadelphia 7, Pa. Persons who wish to add their names may be permitted to do so at any time during the year and come forward with their groups to reaffirm their commitment on the occasion of the next "Covenant Sunday."

5. Maintain spiritual oversight of the covenanting groups to encourage each group to meet together for discussion related to changes in their neighborhood, approaching neighbors, and the like; to help the groups find qualified nonwhite home buyers when such action is feasible; to provide each group with religious and technical resources on open-occupancy housing and, if desired, window stickers announcing that the occupants of a certain house participate in COOP and have covenanted for nonsegregated housing.

6. Encourage covenanting groups to enlist the co-operation of their neighbors who may happen to be members of other churches or of no church. The fact that persons other than Presbyterians may want to sign the Covenant in a certain neighborhood strengthens rather than weakens this effort. Such persons should be encouraged. Moreover, the session should inform the local council of churches of the Covenant and attempt to make it an interdenominational or co-operative movement among the Protestant churches in any given neighborhood.

Controversy Over "Right to Work" Laws

By Marshal L. Scott, Director, Presbyterian Institute of Industrial Relations

It seems well in this issue to include something about the mounting controversy over "Right to Work" laws. Dr. Scott has written a stringent analysis of the present discussions in one of his recent letters to the alumni of the Institute. We have taken the liberty of developing his communication into a brief article.

Also, we include the basic conclusion of a statement on union membership as a condition of employment which has been approved by the Executive Board of the Division of Christian Life and Work of the National Council.

These two statements form an excellent introduction to a study of this current problem in union-management relations.

THE basic issue regarding "Right to Work" laws is *compulsory unionism*. Shall union membership be voluntary or required?

Concerning union membership, there are three general types of union-management contractual relations, with modifications of each. They are:

An open shop. Here the worker may or may not belong to a union. There may or may not be a union contract. If there is a union-management contract, all workers in the bargaining unit are covered by provisions of the contract, whether they are members of the union or not.

A union shop. Here there is a union-management contract. It provides that the employer hires anyone he wishes but specifies that, after the employee passes the probationary period (usually 30 or 60 days) and becomes a permanent employee, he must join the union as a condition of employment, during the period of the contract. (Among the modifications are often "escape clauses.")

A closed shop. Here there is a union-management contract which includes the provision that the employer will hire only union members. This gives the control of job opportunities to the union.

What the Law Requires

In general, the closed shop has been used only in the crafts, or skilled trades. An employee has gone through an apprentice training period and, after passing his tests, has become a journeyman in his trade. The unions have insisted on controlling the employment to maintain high standards in the craft and to keep down a labor surplus (for steady employment and for a favorable bargaining position). Historically, this is the AFL craft type of union.

The closed shop is illegal, nationally, under provisions of the Taft-

Hartley law. The union shop is permitted, under restricted conditions, by Federal legislation (Taft-Hartley), *except* in those *states* which pass a law making a union shop contract illegal. The Taft-Hartley Act specifically provided that, concerning this issue, state legislation shall supercede Federal legislation.

Seventeen states (unless we missed a recent change) now have laws prohibiting union shop agreements within those states. This means that, even if the company as well as the workers desire a union shop, they may not sign such a contract. *These are the "Right to Work" laws.*

Right to Work?

The popular title "Right to Work" (or "right to wreck," as the unions sometimes say) is misleading. The issue is state legislation outlawing a union shop contract. Back of it all lies this question: Is compulsory unionism good or bad? Those who oppose compulsory unionism (and advocate state laws prohibiting the union shop—the closed shop is already illegal) would argue both from principle and from practical considerations.

Arguments Against the Union Shop

They would insist (and many men feel very strongly about this principle) that it is a denial of an essential freedom to require that a man shall join any organization as a condition of employment. They say that this placing of a condition of employment upon the job interferes with a man's freedom of employment and thus limits his right to work. Whether the limiting condition is acceptable or intolerable makes little difference; the principle of his right to work without such a restricting condition has been violated.

This is compared to the old and hated "yellow dog" contracts (before the 1930's) in which employees were often required to sign a statement that they did not and would not join a union. The argument is that either a "yellow dog" contract or a compulsory union contract is an evil interference with a man's right to work without a restricting condition of employment.

Practical Considerations—The union shop (as did the closed shop) gives a monopoly over conditions of employment to one organization. Theoretically, the union is a democratic organization; it represents all the employees and all have an equal voice in its affairs. In actual practice, this does not work out perfectly. Not all, but most, unions conduct their affairs on the assumption that local meetings are held in one room, with all members present at one time—the town-meeting procedure. Often this is impractical, simply because of numbers. Often it is not easy for a rank-and-file member to buck the organization. Advocates of legislation to make the union shop illegal believe that such laws will stimulate individual protests or minority group competition, and weaken labor monopolies.

Furthermore, the union shop means that union membership is automatic. Everyone is a member whether he is interested, opposed, or just doesn't care. His dues are checked off like his Social Security deductions. No choice or voluntary

action is required of him. This has all the evils of an established state church. It tends toward bureaucratic union management which is farther and farther removed from the rank and file.

Arguments for the Union Shop

On the other side, those who uphold the union shop and oppose the "Right to Work" laws also argue both from principle and from practical considerations.

The advocates of the union shop place the emphasis on the obligations of citizenship. Since all workers in the bargaining unit get the benefits that have come from collective bargaining, and since a majority of the workers have voted for the union and the contract, it is argued that all have a moral obligation to support the union. Anyone who refuses to do so is a "free rider." Many men feel as strongly about this principle as others feel about the principle of the right to work without restricting conditions of employment.

Advocates of the union shop would compare it to our American system of government—all members of the community are taxed for the common welfare. To institute a system of voluntary taxation would mean the collapse of our national defense, our public safety, our education system. We do not compel a man to vote, to hold office, to serve on community committees, but we do compel all to pay taxes to support the benefits he gets from our American way of life. Union shop advocates believe that every worker covered by the benefits of a contract has a moral obligation to support the system that has brought these benefits on the job just as he must support the system that has brought so many benefits off the job.

Practical Considerations—Good union-management relations depend upon several basic factors, one of which is that the workers must be convinced that management is not attempting to destroy the union. It is axiomatic that there can be no mature labor-management co-operation until the workers have "union security."

Many union people feel that there is no "union security" unless every worker belongs to the union. This is debatable. But, it is true that if membership is on a voluntary basis, the union must keep up a constant agitation, most of which must have an antimanagement tone, in order to maintain membership. This struggle to maintain the union handicaps progress toward sound and co-operative labor-management relations. This explains why some companies that opposed the union shop have later come to favor it.

Situations vary widely. It is one thing to have a large plant, employing several thousand men, with steady work and a low turnover in personnel; it is another to have small contractors, employing ten to twenty-five men, for a few days or a few weeks at a time, with constantly changing personnel. In the large factory, it is highly debatable whether complete union membership is essential to keep the union from being broken. In fact, the more hostile the management the more likely that the union will be strong. But where there is the small contractor, the small trucker, the restaurant owner, a sys-

tem of voluntary membership makes unionization almost impossible. Advocates of the union shop argue that the "Right to Work" laws, in effect, simply destroy unions in many industries.

A Summary Analysis

The above has been an oversimplification of the chief arguments for and against compulsory unionization. Where should we stand? With real hesitation I suggest:

Concerning the basic principles involved: There is a moral obligation to join a union, just as there is need to support the right to work without restricting conditions. The emphasis should be upon assuming social responsibility rather than upon "rights."

The advocates of the "Right to Work" laws are morally weak at three points: (a) The emphasis is upon rights rather than upon responsibilities; (b) they are inconsistent in their principle concerning restricting conditions when they single out labor unions (for instance, the requirement to join a hospital insurance group, such as Blue Cross—a private organization—is often a condition of employment, against which they do not protest); and (c) they would use coercion by the state rather than permitting labor and management to arrive at a voluntary agreement (which contradicts their principle of voluntary action).

The advocates for the union shop are morally weak in insisting that a moral obligation must be assumed involuntarily. They insist upon the right of labor and management to arrive at voluntary agreements, free of coercion by the state, but do not grant this same right of voluntary action to the individual.

The Freedom of Union Membership

From the bias of Christian morality, it would seem that the principle should be: Workers should voluntarily join and take responsibilities in the union. Unions should avoid imposing completely automatic membership except in those instances where there will be complete dissolution of the union without the union shop. States should avoid these restrictions upon voluntary labor-management agreements, and should put any legislative emphasis upon protecting the freedom of individuals and minority groups *within* the union.

A Moral Question

The manner of promoting "Right to Work" laws has been morally questionable. While many men support these laws with genuine conviction of conscience, it cannot be denied that the nonindustrial public has been misled. The slogan "right to work" is not really honest because it is not understood by the public. Practically no attempt has been made to explain the real issues (with a few notable exceptions). Furthermore, many persons who have campaigned hard for these state laws are obviously antiunion first and concerned about principles secondarily.

Many of us are bothered about union practices that don't seem right, such as bossed unions, misuse of union funds, pay-offs to business agents, discipline of protesting members, absurd work restrictions. Where these are practiced—and they

are in some unions—they are wrong. But there is little evidence that the "Right to Work" laws will correct these abuses. The need is not to destroy unions but to do everything possible to strengthen democratic processes *within* the unions. Laws requiring honest and secret balloting, laws protecting the right of protest and the right of appeal for individuals or minority groups within the union, would get more honestly and realistically to the heart of the problem.

A Statement of Opposition

Therefore, I oppose state "Right to Work" laws. I would advocate study toward revised state and Federal legislation that will give increased protection to individuals within the unions. More important, I would encourage unions and management both to work toward increased participation by members and improved democratic practices in unions.

If I were a union member or officer I would oppose the union shop in most situations. I think unions will be stronger, in the long haul, when they have to win their membership on merit.

If I were an employer I would encourage employees to be active in the union, rather than in fighting the union shop. In fact, as an employer I would suspect the employee who wouldn't join a union. If he will shirk his obligation to his fellow workers, I wouldn't trust him to be honest to his employer.

Freedom and Responsibility Related to Collective Bargaining

A Statement Approved by the Executive Board, Division of Christian Life and Work, National Council of Churches, July, 1956

UNION membership as a condition of employment places a limitation on the freedom of the individual and there is reason for Christian concern at this point. The right of individuals to have a maximum freedom of choice in selection of types and conditions of work is basic but not absolute. It must be noted that other freedoms are also involved in connection with this problem. Not only do we evidence Christian concern for those who do not wish to join a union, but also for those who do wish to join and maintain a union. And we are concerned for the freedom of the union or of the employer who may wish to sign a union security contract.

While being concerned for these freedoms, we are also aware of the fact that limitations of such freedoms may be required. Limitations upon the right to many kinds of work are fixed on behalf of safety, skill, efficiency, and health. Wherever a limitation or a restriction of freedom has been set or permitted by law it means that the public has decided that some social value has been selected as having greater merit than the right of a worker to employment on his own terms.

Any evaluation of union member-

ship as a condition of employment should give full consideration to its effect upon industrial relations. In some industries management itself shows its view that the closed or the union shop may be an asset in good employer-employee relations. A few labor unions have shown their belief that neither the closed nor the union shop may be necessary or desirable. In still other industries, required union membership is under appraisal by both labor and management as one of many elements to be considered in their relations. Some element of compulsion is present in almost every association of individuals. All men are confronted from time to time with the necessity of yielding to the interests and welfare of others. They are also, at times, under the moral necessity of resisting those compulsions which threaten to destroy them as free and responsible agents of their own minds and consciences.

Thus, while people do not usually like compulsion in any form, they may accept some degree of it in order to achieve values that cannot be secured without it. They recognize that in any social order the exercise of individual freedom may be self-defeating, and that freedom must of necessity in some circumstances be exercised in terms of group decisions.

People should recognize the tendency for compulsion in any form to become evil in its consequences, and remain aware of the fact that only with great difficulty and fine judgment can compulsion be made to serve ideal ends. The question of compulsion is one of the more delicate of moral questions and it has a special bearing on the question of whether membership in a labor union should be made a condition of employment.

In the light of the above considerations and with specific reference to the issues currently raised by state "Right to Work" laws, it is recognized that either requiring by law or forbidding by law union membership as a basis of continuing employment involves grave moral problems. Under the varied circumstances prevailing at different times and places throughout this large country, the National Council of Churches declares no simple judgment on these moral problems upon which highly diverse opinions are held by dedicated Christians.

However, it is the opinion of the Executive Board of the Division of Christian Life and Work that union membership as a basis of continued employment should be neither required nor forbidden by law: the decision should be left to agreement by management and labor through the process of collective bargaining. The freedom of management and labor to negotiate such agreements without the restraints of "Right to Work" laws, however, places upon them a clear responsibility to observe [many] basic principles and safeguards.

By Margaret E. Kuhn, Associate Secretary,
Department of Social Education and Action

The Walls Come Tumbling Down

NO AMERICAN community is entirely free from some form of discrimination and segregation. Ask any nonwhite person or Jew about the walls around certain neighborhoods and employment opportunities, and the unwritten laws that rule in swimming pools, skating rinks, or in the private wards of hospitals—not to mention the other local indignities described on the editorial pages.

Most white people are quite unaware of these walls that have stood so long in their home towns, and nonwhite people have been taught by humiliating experience to accept them quietly. It is rather pointless to continue *talking* about human rights and Christian conscience. Everyone who acknowledges the present crisis in human rights can *do* something now, in home-town territory.

Some of the walls that we have identified may look formidably high, but they may be ready to come down tomorrow with just a little pressure properly applied. In most communities, however, these changes will not come easily or quickly. Indeed, little change will occur at all unless there are deliberate, calculated efforts to bring down the walls; and these deliberate, calculated efforts need not be exerted only by the most powerful and respected people in town. People who may not have access to the mayor or city council and who would not feel prepared to work for legislative measures can take the lead in opening public accommodations and facilities. They can do significant things to end discrimination and segregation in restaurants, movies, parks, swimming pools, department stores, and other public places. They can raise questions in the private groups in which they are members. They can seek friendships and associations with persons of minority groups and work with them for the full freedoms that should be accorded to all persons under God.

How to Begin

1. Find some allies. Seek the friendship and help of persons of another racial group. The process of studying your community is almost as important as the result of your studies. Indeed, the process will often determine what the result will be. As you enlarge your personal association with other groups, try to find opportunities for friendship and close association with individuals who have been segregated.

If there are no persons of minority origin living in your community,

join a national organization that is working for the achievement of human freedom: the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Urban League, the United Council of Church Women, the American Civil Liberties Union.

2. Reread the American Constitution and pay particular attention to the Bill of Rights (the first ten Amendments) and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

3. Find out about the civil rights laws in your state and municipality governing such matters as employment, education, housing, the use of public facilities, transportation services, library, parks. Has your community or state enacted any nondiscriminatory legislation, city ordinance, or executive order? What are the provisions of such legislation? If the present laws are inadequate, are any efforts being made to enact new legislation? What groups are active in sponsoring such laws? Have organizations been formed to keep members of minority groups from attending public schools or voting?

4. Meet a Negro friend or other minority person for luncheon or dinner in a local restaurant, or attend a movie or concert, and determine to what extent your presence in these public places is welcomed or rejected. And if you and your friend have been courteously served, make a special point to thank the waitress or proprietor for serving you promptly and courteously.

Another plan might be to canvass local restaurants and hotels to determine what places would accommodate mixed gatherings. In taking this approach, you might state that you are anticipating future meetings when groups of churchmen will be coming to your community.

A large city in a border state has consistently refused to open its hotels to Negro guests. To change this segregated pattern, a responsible political body in the community has for two years refused to use any of the hotels. Its meetings have been held in churches, schools, and a variety of other public places. Letters have been sent by the officers to the hotel managers, pointing out the business that the hotels have lost by their policy of segregation, and citing examples of national organizations that refused to hold meetings in the community because of the known discriminatory practices of hotel managers and restaurateurs. There is some evidence that a change may come.

A Presbyterian minister and members of his church do not eat in any restaurants that will discriminate. As they enter and ask to be served they inquire whether or not it is possible for Negroes and other minority persons to be accommodated. If the answer is yes, they go in. If the answer is no, they turn away and explain why they must do so. As these Presbyterians travel around the countryside they hope that they are opening the way for Negro families to be received without question as they seek accommodations in hotels and guest houses. If such witness were carried out on a national scale, in every state of the union, and brought to official meetings of hotel managers by members of hotel associations who are also responsible church members, we believe that this

vall of discrimination would be undermined and might even tumble one of these days.

5. Inquire about your community's methods of improving ace relations. Is there a mayor's committee on race relations or a commission on human rights in your community? What are its functions, powers, and ways of work? If such a commission or committee does not exist, it would be highly appropriate or Presbyterian leaders, in cooperation with the religious leaders of other denominations and faiths, to join with people of good will in the community to organize such a committee. The National Association of Intergroup Relations Officials, 1106 Water Board Building, 735 Randolph Street, Detroit 26, Mich., can provide helpful tools.

6. Work through teachers nd school administrators who may e members of the church, and discover what is being taught in the ublic schools about intergroup reations and how the school library nd adult education program can elp.

7. Make inquiry among the octors of the town about the admission practices of the local hositals. Social workers will be able to elp you if minority groups experince any difficulty in securing public ealth services and access to the roup work and recreation programs f character-building organizations the community.

8. Interview lawyers, district torneys, and judges about civil ghts in law enforcement. There may be laws in your municipality or state that have never been properly enforced to safeguard human rights. Often minority persons are brutally handled by the police and pushed around in the courts. Sociologists and lawyers agree that considerable latitude is given to local law enforcement officers. Sometimes they discriminate by enforcing the law vigorously in cases involving minority groups and giving a very loose interpretation of the law in other cases. In some communities, the minority residents may count on the police and other law enforcement officials to help them when they are in difficulty. In other communities, they may expect only antagonism and harsh, unfair treatment.

9. Make a study over a month or two of the newspapers of your community and their coverage of events dealing with race relations. The newspapers in one large Eastern community changed their policies about identification of Negro persons who were involved in minor misdemeanors. No identification by race has appeared except when necessary in order to bring about justice. The newspapers now carry editorials supporting human rights and give favorable coverage of events in which Negro citizens participate. The editors and publishers have been encouraged to do so by a bulwark of community opinion that supports intelligent, fair handling of the news.

Above all, resist the temptation to feel that the problem is too big for ordinary people to tackle, and encourage the latent forces of good will in the community that are ready to be directed to constructive goal.

PEANUTS
SOMETIMES THAT CHARLIE BROWN IS PRETTY CLEVER..
THREE BIG BOYS FROM THE SECOND GRADE WERE CHASING HIM TODAY...
HE RAN AND RAN AND RAN, BUT THEY KEPT GETTING CLOSER AND CLOSER AND CLOSER...
12-18
SUDDENLY HE ORGANIZED A DISCUSSION GROUP!
SCHULZ

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